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The Robinson-Patman Act:
Is Section 2(c) Back?
G. David Schiering*
The author, who has participated in the defense of actions involving
section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, traces the history of litigation
brought under this controversial statute and then examines the attempts
by eliminated middlemen to revive section 2(c). The historical treatment
culminates with an analysis of the language in Broch and Thomasville
which suggests that behavior proscribed by section 2(c) should not be con-
sidered a per se violation of the Robinson-Patman Act because a finding of
discrimination is required for a violation and because the economic-justi-
fication defenses available under other sections of the Act are equally avail-
able under section 2(c). The author concludes that middlemen should not
be permitted to use this section to prohibit their elimination and thereby
create a market barrier to increased efficiency in the distribution of goods.
I. INTRODUCTION
"THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT," stated Earl Kintner, "is
not the hallmark of clarity."' The Act has been described
as "unworkable," "hopelessly obscure," and the " 'Typhoid Mary' of
antitrust. 2
Other authors have characterized the Robinson-Patman Act as
"confusing, obscurely worded and overly maligned. 3 The "osten-
sible purpose of the Act was to curb the use of buying power as a
means of compelling price favoritism. 4  Unfortunately, mass mer-
chandising, which Congress was attempting to regulate through
the Act, was only vaguely understood when the Act was passed.5
This lack of understanding and the degree of congressional compro-
mise necessary to pass the Act,6 together with changing economic
*B.A., DePauw University, 1962; M.A. University of Chicago, 1964; J.D. University
of Cincinnati, 1970. The author, a member of the Ohio Bar, is associated with the
firm of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio.
This article is an outgrowth of a speech given at the Ohio State Bar Association's
Ninth Annual Antitrust Institute.
1. E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 14 (1970).
2. Id.
3. Mezines, Brokerage-When is it Permitted Under the Robinson-Patman
Act?, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 821, 822 (1966).
4. Id.
5. KINTNER, supra note 1, at 14.
6. Id. For additional reviews of the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman
Act, see C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1952); D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT (1964); C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959); F.
ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962).
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conditions and increasingly sophisticated methods of distributing
goods, have resulted in a confusing regulatory device poorly suited,
in many respects, to current economic realities.
On January 22, 1975, Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, noted that the Robin-
son-Patman Act warranted attention and, possibly, legislative amend-
ment or even repeal.7 Kauper noted that:
The Robinson-Patman Act was adopted during the De-
pression, with little thought given to its effect on long-run
economic efficiency. Today, given our general concern
with the state of the economy and our specific need to pro-
mote economic efficiency, Robinson-Patman clearly deserves
reexamination. . . . It could be left as it is. It could sim-
ply be repealed. It could be amended to preserve special
remedies against anticompetitive price discrimination by
eliminating language which discourages legitimate price
competition. . . . What is clear is that we need to be
thinking about it and, to the extent necessary, doing some-
thing about it.
8
Even more recently, on October 29, 1975, Mr. Jonathan C. Rose,
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, noted
that the Act stabilizes oligopoly prices, fosters price-fixing, discour-
ages hard bargaining, discourages competition and new entry, forces
costly and complicated distribution systems, forces uneconomic
and wasteful expenditures, and forces costly and unnecessary
legal advice.9 He concluded quite simply that in his personal opin-
ion "outright repeal is probably the most intellectually sound and
economically defensible approach."'10
7. Kauper, Some Comments on Enforcement Activities Of The Antitrust
Division And The Division's Role In Legislative Reform, 19 LAW QUADRANGLE
NOTES 5, 8 (Winter 1975) (based on an address before the Antitrust Section of the
New York State Bar Association, January 22, 1975).
The White House Task Force report on antitrust policy recommended a revision of
the Robinson-Patman Act which omitted entirely any reference to brokerage. The
report explains that the proposed revision, which proscribes direct or indirect dis-
criminations in the "exaction of consideration," would encompass the transactions
now covered by section 2(c). The White House Task Force Report On Antitrust
Policy, reprinted in 411 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT 1, 18 (Supp.
II, May 27, 1969) (hereinafter cited as the Neal Report). The proposed revision
would, however, permit the cost-justification and meeting-competition defenses to be
used in defending challenges to brokerage activity. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Rose, the Robinson-Patman Act: A Misguided Response To The A & P,
speech before The Legal Committee of the Grocery Manufacturers Association on
October 29, 1975 (available on request from The Department of Justice).
10.. Id. at 15.
"It is safe to say that no federal enactment has received more widespread
criticism throughout its statutory life." Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Pro-
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Mr. Kauper and Mr. Rose were certainly aware that 20 years
ago, a distinguished group of lawyers spent almost 2 years conduct-
ing an evaluation of the Robinson-Patman Act." The result was
a 400-page document entitled Report Of The Attorney General's
National Committee To Study The Antitrust Laws.'2 While the Re-
port is chock full of brilliant analyses, there is not a simple recom-
mendation that could be seized upon as the basis of appropriate
legislative reform. One of the best but obviously overly general
recommendations for current analysis is as follows:
Statutory provisions affecting distribution should,
therefore, be applied to reflect not only reasonable clar-
ity and internal consistency, but above all, to remove mar-
ket barriers to efficient distribution and thus serve basic
antitrust objectives.' 3
With this general recommendation in mind, it would be worthwhile
to inspect some aspect of the Robinson-Patman Act which in 1976
could be revised to remove market barriers to efficient distribution.
Section 2(c) of the Act14 has, in some respects, become a barrier
to efficient distribution and unfortunately has experienced some re-
vitalization in the 1970's. That section, therefore, is an appropriate
candidate for current review.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EARLY DECISIONS
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act reads as follows:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or
grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com-
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allow-
ance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services ren-
dered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such
transaction or to an agent, representative, or other inter-
cedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1971).
I1. One of the lawyers war present Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens.
However, Justice Stevens did not separately identify himself with any particular
majority or minority opinion which would give insight into his philosophical approach
to the antitrust laws. Justice Stevens has, however, signed decisions as a Circuit
Judge in a number of antitrust cases. For a list of those decisions see 206 TRADE REG.
REP. 4 (Dec. 8, 1975).
12. NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
(1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT).
13. Id. at 132.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970).
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mediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact
for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect con-
trol, of any party to such transaction other than the person
by whom such compensation is so granted or paid.' 5
The provision contains 115 words, 14 commas, 12 "ors," and 1 peri-
od. It is certainly not, as Earl Kintner said, the hallmark of clar-
ity. In fact, section 2(c) is probably the most confusing and fault-
ily drafted section of the Robinson-Patman Act.
In general, section 2(c) prohibits commission payments by a
seller to a broker who is actually acting for the buyer in a trans-
action. 16  It also prohibits the granting of a discount directly to a
buyer if the discount is "in lieu of' a brokerage commission.
17
Section 2(c) was specifically directed against the practices of ob-
taining discriminatory price concessions through fictitious or "dum-
my" brokers, and against reductions of price equivalent to the
seller's ordinary payment of brokerage on other sales.1
8
Prior to the passage of the Act, large buyers were obtaining in-
direct price concessions by requiring sellers to pay a "brokerage" fee
to agents of the buyers.' 9 In many instances, those agents were
not, in fact, performing any brokerage services. The agents would
pass the brokerage fee along to the buyers who thereby received a
discount. There were, in addition, other abuses of the brokerage
payment being used to achieve price concessions.2 ° It seemed fair
to conclude, upon passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, that sec-
tion 2(c) was intended to encompass and prohibit all abuses of the
brokerage function which resulted in price discrimination.2'
But if it was abuses to which the section was directed, then price
concessions equal to the cost savings actually realized by eliminat-
ing the seller's legitimate brokerage costs should have been permis-
sible. This cost-savings defense had been specifically provided for
in challenges to price discriminations covered by section 2(a) of
15. Id.
16. Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v.
FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
17. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 26 F.T.C. 486 (1938), affd., 106 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940).
18. See FTC, FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE" INVESTIGATION, S. Doc.
No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25, 62-63 (1935). See generally BECKMAN & NOLEN,
THE CHAIN STORE PROBLEM, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1938); Fulda, Food Distribution
in the United States: The Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L.
REV. 1051 (1951).
19. See F. RowE, supra note 6, at 333.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1936); S. REP. No. 1502,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
21. See REPORT 187-88.
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the Act.22 That is, if a seller reduced his price by an amount equal
to the value of functions or services normally performed by the
seller, but actually performed by the buyer in this transaction, then
no illegal price discrimination occurred. Interestingly enough, how-
ever, an early draft of section 2(a) specifically stated that this cost-
justification defense was not applicable to differences in cost result-
ing from reduced brokerage costs. 23  The House Report and the
Conference Report then eliminated this reference to brokerage in
section 2(a) and added to the new section 2(c) a provision pro-
24hibiting the payment of brokerage except for services rendered.
The Conference Committee Report explained that this change was
25made because section 2(c) deals with the matter of brokerage.
And there simply is no indication in the legislative history as to
whether 2(c), as finally enacted, was intended to permit price reduc-
tions which reflected true savings in brokerage costs.
Within three years, rather clear answers to this question had
been given by the Second, 26 Third,27 and ]ourth2 Circuits. Those
circuits established, by 1939, that section 2(c) was to be interpreted
independently of section 2(a), 29 that the cost-justification defense
was not available in a section 2(c) case,30 and that a violation of
section 2(c) could be found even in the absence of a discriminatory
price or a lessening of competition. 3' In Great Atlantic and Pa-
22. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) states: "[TLhat nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered .. "
For the factors involved in establishing the cost-justification defense see United
States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962). See FTC v. Standard Motor Prods.,
Inc., 371 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1967); American Motors Corp. v. FTC, 384 F.2d 247 (6th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1012 (1968). See generally Rowe, Cost Justi-
fication of Price Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 59 COLUM. L. REV.
584 (1959).
23. S. REp. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936), reprinted in F. ROWE,
supra note 6, at 578.
24. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1936), reprinted in F.
ROWE, supra note 6, at 588.
25. H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-9 (1936). See F. RowE, supra
note 6, at 612.
26. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
634 (1938).
27. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 625 (1940).
28. Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
29. See Note, Beleaguered Brokers: The Evisceration of Section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1308, 1313-14 (1964).
30. See REPORT 188-89.
31. See Modern Marketing Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
See generally Mezines, supra note 3, at 824-29.
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cific Tea Co. v. FTC,3 2 the court tested an arrangement where the
buyer, A&P, used its own personnel as field buyers, making brokers
unnecessary. A&P purchased goods at a net price which was re-
duced by an amount equivalent to the customary payment to brok-
ers. A&P claimed that the services it rendered provided the sellers
with a cost savings equal to the normal brokerage commission and
therefore A&P was justified in receiving that savings as a price re-
duction. But the court refused to allow the cost-savings defense as
a justification for the price concession. Thus, even if the buyer
performed its own brokerage functions, it could not be compen-
sated by a price reduction equal to the value of that function.3 3
In Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC,34 the respondent, Biddle,
acted as a purchasing agent for buyers in the food business and, in
addition, sold to those buyers certain market information. When
purchasing on behalf of those buyers, Biddle received a brokerage
fee from the sellers which sometimes exceeded the charge which-
the firm made to the buyers. Biddle credited the buyers with the
full amount of brokerage fees received from the seller. Therefore,
at least in some cases, Biddle passed on to the buyers a broker-
age fee which exceeded the cost of the services which it rendered
to those buyers. Biddle claimed that it was rendering a proper
service for both sellers and buyers and was therefore entitled to a
commission from both. The court rejected his claim, reasoning that
Congress had intended to prohibit payments of a brokerage fee by
a seller to a buyer or a buyer's agent because those payments were
an unfair trade practice. The court stated: [O]ne of the principal
evils inherent in -the payment of brokerage fees by the seller to
the buyer directly or through an intermediary, is the fact that this
practice makes it possible for the seller to discriminate in price
without seeming to do so."' "5 Section 2(c) was intended to "force
price discrimination out into the open."36
In Oliver Bros. v. FTC,37 the Fourth Circuit recognized that pay-
ments made to a broker by a seller and then passed on to the buyers
came within the ambit of 2(c). According to the court, however,
passing such payments on had the inherent tendency to lessen com-
petition and create a monopoly, regardless of the effect which such
32. 106 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940).
33. But see Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962)
(discussed at notes 60-68 infra and accompanying text); Main Fish Co., 53 F.T.C.
88 (1956).
34. 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
35. Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
19761
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
activity had on competition in any particular instance. Therefore,
the court found it unnecessary to test whether those payments ac-
tually had the effect of lessening competition. In refusing to read
into section 2(c) the requirement of section 2(a) that the practice
have an adverse effect on competition to be deemed a violation,
the court stated: "[N]o reason suggests itself why the limitations
and provisions relating to one [section of the Act] should be read
into those relating to the other.
3 8
The per se nature of 2(c) was at least indirectly recognized by
the Supreme Court. 9 The requirement that there be a showing of
injury to competition appeared to be unnecessary for a finding that
section 2(c) was violated. It seemed that there simply were no de-
fenses available if, in fact, the proscribed brokerage payment or pay-
ment in lieu of brokerage was found.40
Other early cases tested and found illegal those brokerage com-
missions paid to and actually retained by agents of the buyer.
The first two such cases were Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC41 and
42Quality Bakers of America v. FTC. In those cases, the courts held
that such payments were prohibited by section 2(c) because their
effect is the same regardless of whether they are held by that agent
or passed on to the buyer.
It seemed bad enough that section 2(c) was viewed by the courts
as a per se section, that the effect on competition was irrelevant, and
that the cost-justification defense was not available. But to make
matters worse, in Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC,43 the FTC chal-
lenged the propriety of brokerage payments received by a distributor
which was purchasing for its own account and reselling to whole-
salers. The distributor attempted to show that by taking title to
the products and rendering the many services associated with a true
distributor, it was entitled to the brokerage payments. The Com-
mission had simply excluded evidence of those services and func-
tions. 4 The court of appeals agreed, stating that the services rendered
38. Id. at 767.
39. In FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959), which actually was
a section 2(e) case, the Court stated:
Subsections (c), (d), and (e) [of the Robinson-Patman Act], on the other hand,
unqualifiedly make unlawful certain business practices other than price dis-
crimination. . . . In terms, the proscriptions of these three subsections are
absolute. Unlike § 2(a), none of them requires, as proof of a prima facie vio-
lation, a showing that the illicit practice has had an injurious or destructive
effect on competition.
40. See FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1959).
41. 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 638 (1940).
42. 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940).
43. 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945).
44. Southgate Brokerage Co., 39 F.T.C. 166 (1944).
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by the distributor were actually rendered to itself as a buyer. And,
because the brokerage payment was made to a buyer, it was illegal.
Even though the distributor competed with brokers in reselling the
goods to wholesalers and, therefore, received no discriminatory
price concession from the seller, nonetheless, the court held that
"[P]rice discrimination . .. is not necessary to a violation of Sec-
tion 2(c) . ..which specifically forbids the payment of brokerage
by the seller to the buyer or the buyer's agent." 5 The distributor
could not, therefore, justify receipt of brokerage by the services it
rendered because "For sellers to pay purchasers for purchasing,
warehousing, or reselling the goods purchased is to pay them for
doing their own work, and is a mere gratuity.""6  This use of 2(c)
clearly established a market barrier.47
Although these early cases permitted section 2(c) to be used in an
economically adverse manner, the interpretation of the section ap-
peared settled by 1959. It seemed quite clear that a reduction in
price achieved by a commensurate reduction in brokerage fee,
whether that reduction was paid by the broker or by the seller,
violated section 2(c).4  It also seemed quite clear that brokerage
commissions paid directly from the seller to the buyer,49 brokerage
payments made to and retained by the buyer's agent,50 and broker-
age payments made from sellers to middlemen or brokers who were
purchasing for their own accounts5' were prohibited by section
45. 150 F.2d at 609 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 611. See also American Nat'l Growers Corp., 55 F.T.C. 1321 (1959);
Chinook Packing Co., 55 F.T.C. 611 (1958); Columbia River Ass'n, 44 F.T.C. 118
(1947); W. E. Robinson & C6., 32 F.T.C. 370 (1941).
47. See REPORT 191: "In our opinion, the virtual legal monopoly conferred by
Section 2(c) on one type of middleman clogs competition in the channels of distribu-
tion, and exacts tribute from the consumer for the benefit of a special business
class."
Mr. Rose, in his speech on October 29, 1975, stated that"
Perhaps one of the most serious effects of the [Robinson-Patman] Act is its
needless complication of distribution systems .... Sections 2(c), (d), and
(e) of the Act bar the payment of brokerage and furnishing of allowances or
facilities, without need to show anti-competitive effects of such practices.
Such provisions serve to preserve unneeded brokerage operations and to
restrict arbitrarily the manner in which a seller may structure his mixture of
prices and compensating allowances.
Rose, supra note 9, at 10-11.
48. See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir.
1939).
49. See, e.g., Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940);
Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 638 (1940).
50. See, e.g., In re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1959).
51. See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945).
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2(c). Apparently it made no difference in any of these instances
that the brokerage payment was equivalent to the value of the services
rendered by the buyer, the buyer's agent, or the broker purchasing
for his own account. 2 In addition, it appeared that there was no
need to ascertain the effect that such payments had on competi-
tion,53 and the cost-justification defense was unavailable. 4 In short,
section 2(c) looked like a per se section of the antitrust laws.
III. THE DECADE FOLLOWING Broch (1960-1970)
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided FTC v. Henry Broch &
Co.5 In Broch, the seller agreed to absorb one-half of the price
reduction by accepting a lower brokerage fee. The sale was con-
summated on that basis and the court held that 2(c) was violated
because the buyer had received a discount in lieu of brokerage.
There was an attempt in Broch to justify this price reduction
on the grounds that the buyer had rendered valuable services to
the seller. The court rejected this defense, noting:
There is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services
to the seller or to the [broker] nor that anything in its meth-
od of dealing justified its getting a discriminatory price
by means of a reduced brokerage charge. We would have
quite a different case if there were such evidence ....
Thus, while the Supreme Court refused to apply the cost-justi-
fication defense, its holding was clearly limited to a discriminatory
price which resulted from reduced brokerage. Elsewhere in the
opinion, the Court noted that price discrimination was indeed the
target of section 2(c), suggesting that a per se application of the sec-
tion might not be necessary or appropriate:
[C]ongress in its wisdom phrased § 2(c) broadly, not only
to cover the other methods then in existence but all other
means by which brokerage could be used to effect price
discrimination.57
T . .lThis is not to say that every reduction in price,
coupled with a reduction in brokerage, automatically com-
pels the conclusion that an allowance "in lieu" of broker-
52. See, e.g., Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940).
53. See, e.g., Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
54. See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940).
55. 363 U.S. 166"(1960).
56. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
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age has been granted. As the Commission itself has made
clear, whether such reduction is tantamount to a discrimi-
natory payment of brokerage depends on the circumstances
of each case.5 8
. . . We need not view [certain FTC decisions] as lay-
ing down an absolute rule that § 2(c) is violated by the
passing on of savings in broker's commissions to direct
buyers, for here, as we have emphasized, the "savings"
in brokerage were passed on to a single buyer who was not
shown in any way to have deserved favored treatment.5 9
The Supreme Court had, therefore, left a variety of openings
for courts to consider use of the cost-justification defense in a 2(c)
case and to consider the effect on competition when testing bro-
kerage practices under section 2(c). The circuit courts seized upon
these openings very quickly. In 1962, only two years after the
Broch decision, the Fifth Circuit decided Thomasville Chair Co. v.
FTC.60 Quite simply, the Fifth Circuit read into section 2(c) the
cost-justification defense traditionally available for challenges un-
der section 2(a). The decision indicated that a seller could pass on
to buyers the savings realized by the elimination of a broker.6'
In addition, the court recognized that such reductions in price vio-
lated section 2(c) only if the reductions resulted in a price which
62
was discriminatory.
Basil Mezines concluded that the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
"robs . . . Section [2(c)] of all vitality. 63  To the contrary, this
58. Id. at 175-76 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 177 n.19.
See also FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367 n.8 (1962): "Nor need the
[FTC] order, where viewed in the context of Broch's violation, be read as prohibiting
Broch from reducing commissions competitively to gain a particular buyer's account,
if the competitive setting would otherwise have afforded a defense to a charge under
§ 2(c)." (Emphasis added).
60. 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
61. Id. at 545:
[A]s we read it, the [Supreme] Court's [Broch] opinion says that a reduction
in price, giving effect to reduced [brokerage] commissions paid by the seller,
are violations of Section 2(c) only if such reduction in price is "discri-
minatory." We read that to mean "without justification based on actual
bona fide differences in the costs of sales resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are sold or delivered."
62. Id. See also Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410
(7th Cir. 1963).
63. Mezines, Brokerage-When is it Permitted Under the Robinson-Patman
Act?, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 821, 835 (1966). In 1969, however, a Commission of
the American Bar Association took note of "the large and growing body of uniformly
critical opinion questioning the FTC's enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act, and,
in particular, of the per se and quasi per se rules embodied in 2(c) of the Act .. "
ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE
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interpretation seemed more in line with the goal of achieving the
economically efficient distribution of goods. Other cases in the early
1960's indicated that a seller was free to eliminate the services
of a broker, convert to direct selling, and reduce its prices in an
amount substantially equivalent to the costs previously incurred in
using a broker.64  In addition, the FTC65 and the Second Circuit
66
recognized that certain discounts granted in an amount equivalent
to a normal brokerage charge could be labelled as functional dis-
counts rather than a saving of brokerage. But the shadow of the
Southgate case remained, and several cases in the early 1960's
adopted the Southgate approach. 67  With these conflicting posi-
tions on the books in 1965 the section 2(c) cases simply stopped
for about five years, except for FTC actions.68
IV. SECTION 2(c) IN THE 1970's-A NEW TWIST
The use of section 2(c) in private litigation has increased in the
last few years. Only 11 private actions alleging violations of sec-
tion 2(c) were reported during the 25-year period from 1936 to
1961.69 And only three such actions were reported from 1961 to
1970.70 But at least 15 private actions alleging violations of section
2(c) were instituted during the recent six-year period of 1970 through
ABA COMMISSION To STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (67 1969),
reprinted in 427 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT 1, 37, (Sept. 16,
1969).
64. See, e.g., Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th
Cir. 1963); Venus Foods, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1025 (1960). See also Robinson v. Stanley
Home Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959); In re Whitney & Co., 273 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1959).
65. Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962); see Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc., 65
F.T.C. 1099 (1964).
66. Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 354 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.
1965), vacated and District Court aft'd., 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1966).
67. See, e.g., Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc., 65 F.T.C. 1099 (1964).
68. See, e.g., Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 77 F.T.C. 705 (1970) (consent decree); Scott
Finks Co., 75 F.T.C. 974 (1969) (consent decree); Advisory Opinion No. 328, [1967-70
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,687 (FTC 1969); Connell Rice & Sugar Co.,
75 F.T.C. 505 (1969) (consent decree); Griff's of America, Inc., 72 F.T.C. 616 (1967)
(consent decree); A. Greenhouse, Inc., 71 F.T.C. 699 (1967) (consent decree).
69. Barber, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson-Patman
Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 194-95 (1961). Some of the cases alleged
that section 2(c) was violated by a "commercial bribe" made to the buyer. See, e.g.,
Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
70. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (commercial bribery); Schwartz v. Martin, 1968
Trade Cas. 72,534 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman &
Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (commercial bribery).
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1975.1 In contrast, 148 FTC actions alleging violations of section
2(c) were instituted from 1936 to 196172 but only five such actions
were instituted by the FTC from 1971 through 1975.73
In some measure, the recent increase in private actions under
71. Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1974); Cornwell
Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971); El Salto, S.A. v. PSG
Co., 444 F.2d 477 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Jones v. Borden Co.,
430 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1970); Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F. Supp. 58 (M.D.
Pa. 1975); Rohrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1975 Trade Cas. 60,352 (E.D. Mich.
1975); Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Fruehauf Cnrp., 390 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Okla. 1974);
Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Benco, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D. Ark. 1974), aJffd., 1976-1
Trade Cas. 60,701 (8th Cir. 1976); Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Hoganson & As-
sociates, 362 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill, 1973); Stutzman Feed Serv., Inc. v. Todd Sargent,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Donovan, Inc. v. Lum's, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,083 (N.D. 11. 1972); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 1974 Trade Cas.
75,046 (N.D. Ill. 1972), appeal dismissed, (unreported order) (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 930 (1974); Mississippi Petroleum, Inc. v. Vermont Gas Sys., Inc., 1972
Trade Cas. 73,843 (S.D. Miss. 1972); Waters v. National Farmers Organization,
Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Ind. 1971). Most of the section 2(c) allegations in
these cases were dismissed on pretrial motions.
72. C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 69-70 (1959).
73. Source is author's review of periodicals and trade regulation services. See
Herbert R. Gibson, Jr., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,844 (FTC 1975) (complaint issued);
Men's Mkt. Serv., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,759 (FTC 1974) (consent decree);
H. C. Bohack Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,417 (FTC 1973) (initial decision to dismiss
charges); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 82 F.T.C. 727 (1973) (consent decree); Frozen Food
Forum, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,963 (FTC 1972) (pro-
posed complaint). See also Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 479 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1973). The
author's request for current statistical information from the FTC under the Freedom of
Information Act was denied. In 1959,28 of the 61 cease-and-desist orders issued by
the FTC involved alleged violations of section 2(c). Barber, supra note 69, at 196
n.53. The FTC's preoccupation with section 2(c) was criticized by one author who,
after noting that the cease-and-desist orders involving brokerage from 1936 to 1957
were almost as numerous as all others combined, stated: "There is no reason to be-
lieve that during the more than twenty years since the passage of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, the payment of brokerage commissions by sellers to buyers has consti-
tuted the principal threat to competition evident among discriminatory practices.
." C. EDWARDS, supra note 72, at 70-71. The Neal Report recognized the in-
appropriate amount of activity under section 2(c): "Because violations of these sub-
sections are relatively easy to establish, they have attracted a disproportionate
amount of enforcement activity and have had substantial anticompetitive effects,
suppressing many legitimate transactions." The White House Task Force Report
On Antitrust Policy, reprinted in 411 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION RE-
PORT 1, 10 (Supp. II, May 27, 1969). In 1969, a Commission of the American Bar
Association recommended that the FTC direct proceedings under section 2(c) only
in instances where there is injury to competition. ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at
67-68. The Acting Chairman of the FTC, Paul Rand Dixon, has recently stated
that he intends to ensure that the FTC enforces the Robinson-Patman Act fully.
750 BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REPORT A-24, 25 (Feb. 10, 1976).
Some interesting recent statistics on the activities of the Department of Justice can
be found in Handler, Antitrust Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 211 (1975).
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section 2(C)74 is attributable to a combination of economic condi-
tions and increasingly sophisticated methods of distribution which
both need and permit the elimination of unnecessary participants in
the task of moving goods from the manufacturer to the ultimate
purchaser. Distributors, commissioned agents, and brokers have, in
varying numbers, been eliminated from that process. The termina-
tion of such middlemen, particularly distributors, has initiated a
host of antitrust cases."5 Most of these cases have been brought
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.76  But for the most
part, the courts have turned away these challenges recognizing that
a manufacturer can unilaterally decide with whom it will or will not
deal77 and can even consult with one distributor in deciding to replace
another distributor so long as one of the distributors remains in the
marketplace, thereby not lessening competition.78  As a result, mid-
74. The number of private actions filed under the antitrust laws generally has
risen from 446 in 1965 to 1,230 in 1974. Id. at 235 n.120.
75. The section 1 theory most often articulated is that the manufacturer conspired
with a newly appointed distributor to terminate the prior distributor thereby consti-
tuting a conspiracy to eliminate the competition of the terminated distributor. The
section 2 theory often advanced is that the manufacturer terminated the distributor
and began selling directly to the distributor's potential customers thereby achieving
a monopoly or, at least, constituting an attempt to monopolize.
76. See, e.g., cases cited notes 77 and 78 infra.
77. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); see Burdett Sound,
Inc. v. Altec Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,404 (5th Cir. 1975); White Bag Co. v.
International Paper Co., 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,188 (4th Cir. 1974); Bushie v.
Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Ricchetti v. Meister Brau, Inc., 431
F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); Scanlan v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 388 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 916 (1968); Thomas v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F. Supp. 58 (M.D. Pa. 1975). If the termination is moti-
vated by an attempt to enforce resale price-fixing or to coerce adherence to anticom-
petitive policies, a substantial question is raised. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1968); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); United States v.
General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300
(1919); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Lessig
v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). See
generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Re-
stricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975). Likewise, if the party refusing to deal holds a dominant
position in the market with its product, a substantial question may be raised under
section 2 of the Sherman Act. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1973); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359
(1926); Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d
968 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969).
78. See Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Ass'n., 446 F.2d 289 (9th
Cir. 1971); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Ace Beer Distrib., Inc. v.
Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); Schwing Motor
Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823
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dlemen whose participation in the distribution process has been re-
duced or eliminated are searching for other legal theories to redress
their alleged injury. One approach has been to use section 2(c).
The theory advanced is that when a seller eliminates a middleman
and grants to the buyer a discount which includes some or all of
the amount previously paid to that middleman, the buyer receives a
discount in lieu of brokerage, thereby violating section 2(c). 79 This
theory would prohibit manufacturers from passing on to purchasers
the savings realized from streamlining the distribution system.
Numerous cases have indicated that the antitrust laws do not
prohibit manufacturers from eliminating completely one level of the
distribution process by converting to direct sales rather than using
middlemen.80 As stated in B&B Oil & Chemical Co. v. Franklin
Oil Corp.:81
It is just at this point that plaintiff's case fails, even conced-
ing the inequities charged, since the result of the defend-
ant's activities [the elimination of a distributor and con-
version to direct sales] is not destruction of competition
but merely the substitution of one supply source for an-
other, whether it be the manufacturer himself or another
distributor. The opinions have been unanimous, insofar as
we have been able to determine, in holding that a manu-
facturer's changes in his distribution system, vertical re-
alignments, eliminations, or transfers, do not offend the
anti-trust acts.
If the elimination or substitution of middlemen is itself a permissible
activity, it would seem highly inappropriate to prohibit the manu-
facturer from passing along to the buyer some or all of the savings
realized by such a change.
8 2
(1957). But see Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966). See generally Roth Office Equip. Co.
v. GF Business Equip. Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,563 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Overseas
Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974), afld., 519
F.2d 119(6th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 96S. Ct. 395(1975); B & B Oil& Chem. Co.
v. Franklin Oil Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
79. See, e.g., Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir.
1971); Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Hoganson & Associates, 362 F. Supp. 78 (N.D.
Ill. 1973).
80. See, e.g., Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974);
Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Stanley Home
Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 601 (Ist Cir. 1959); B & B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil Corp.,
293 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Mich. 1968); La Rouche v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 166
F. Supp. 633 (D. Mass. 1958).
81. 293 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
82. See Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 601, 604 (1st Cir.
1959).
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In Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Hoganson & Associates,83 the
court squarely faced this issue. A commissioned agent had been
receiving a 5 percent commission on sales he obtained for a manu-
facturer. This arrangement was terminated and the manufacturer
allegedly agreed with the customers to sell directly to the customers
granting a reduction in price equivalent to the 5 percent previously
paid to the commissioned agent. The agent claimed this reduction
in price was a discount in lieu of brokerage violative of section 2(c).
The court dismissed this count for failure to state a claim:
The change in the relationship between a buyer and seller
resulting in the elimination of a broker does not, per se,
fall within the scope of anticompetitive practices prohib-
ited by federal anti-trust laws. A manufacturer's elimina-
tion of a middleman to deal directly with the buyer does
not offend the federal antitrust laws ...
Federal courts have refused to construe the Robinson-
Patman Act as prohibiting conversion to direct selling and
passing on any savings to the buyer. . . . The thrust of
[PlaintiTs] contention is that a manufacturer who makes a
price reduction when he converts to direct selling has,
without more, made an allowance in lieu of brokerage.
The [Plaintiffs] contention is tantamount to declaring
that manufacturers cannot so convert, or if done, the Rob-
inson-Patman Act forbids passing on any saving to cus-
tomers. Such a construction of the Robinson-Patman Act
is legally improper, and practically speaking, unsound.84
The issue for consideration in future challenges of this nature is
what "more" must be proved to find a violation of section 2(c)
when a manufacturer eliminates a middleman and converts to direct
sales, granting some or all of the middleman expense as a reduction
in price to the purchaser. A mere showing that the manufacturer
agreed in advance with the purchaser to make such a conversion
will not be adequate. 85 The manufacturer which converts its en-
tire marketing strategy from middlemen to direct sales should not
be precluded from passing on the middleman expenses to all cus-
tomers, even if a cost savings cannot be demonstrated, because there
is no price discrimination and no lessening of competition in such a
course of action. 86 If the manufacturer converts from pure distrib-
utors or independent middlemen to direct sales there should be no
violation of section 2(c) in passing on the middleman expense be-
cause the discount or price reduction afforded a truly independent
83. 362 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
84. Id. at 82.
85. See id.
86. See Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1962).
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title-taking middleman is a functional discount and not a commis-
sion, brokerage or compensation.8 7  The elimination of that function
and the passing on of the expense is not, therefore, the granting
of a discount in lieu of brokerage.
The more difficult case is where the manufacturer eliminates
commissioned salesmen or agents in a limited number of sales and
passes some or all of that expense on to the purchasers. As stated
in Green Bay, these facts "without more" do not state a claim un-
der section 2(c)."8 But if the practice results in discriminatory
prices, further inquiry may be required, particularly if the industry
involved is one which traditionally utilizes brokers.8 9 As suggested
by Thomasville Chair,90 the manufacturer should still be permitted
to demonstrate that the reduction in such sales is the equivalent
of savings actually realized by the elimination of unnecessary selling
expenses, that the reduction is therefore cost-justified, and that no
indefensible discriminatory price resulted. 91 No violation of section
2(c) should, in such instance, be found. But if the reduction is
discriminatory and cannot be cost-justified, and if the industry is
one which customarily utilizes brokers, a substantial question
is raised under section 2(c). It is, unfortunately, at this point
that the barrier to efficient distribution is raised and only legislative
reform can remove it.
92
Even in such circumstances, there is sufficient law to prevent the
87. Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose Corp., 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); In re Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437
(1962).
88. 362 F. Supp. at 82.
89. See E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 211 (1970): "Doing some
business with a broker is seemingly the pivotal element connecting the discount at
issue with the brokerage provision [of Section 2(c)]."
90. 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
91. Id. at 545; see 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 137 (1961) (cited in Thomasville as
an "intelligent discussion" of the cost-justification issue).
It should be noted, however, that the FTC only grudgingly complied with the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Thomasville Chair. Upon remand, the Commission
took the opportunity to state, "The Commission does not ... acquiesce in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals as such, which contains dicta with which the Com-
mission does not necessarily agree." In re Thomasville Chair Co., 63 F.T.C. 1048,
1049 (1963). The FTC did not delineate the grounds of disagreement with the Fifth
Circuit, but the broad cost-justification defense announced by the Fifth Circuit in that
case has been conspicuously absent from subsequent court and FTC decisions. See E.
KINTNER, supra note 89, at 226. But see Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc., 65 F.T.C. 1099, 1152
(1964) (separate opinion), where one of the Commissioners of the FTC indicated a
more receptive attitude toward Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC.
92. In recommending repeal of section 2(c), the Neal Report noted that the
section has "had substantial anticompetitive effects, suppressing many legitimate
transactions and "directly" interfering with "price competition at both the seller and
the broker level." Neal Report, supra note 73, at 10.
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abuse of section 2(c) by eliminated middlemen.93 The Clayton Act
provides that private actions brought under the antitrust laws may be
brought only by "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.
. . . The plaintiff must prove not only that the antitrust laws
have been violated, but also that there was injury to the plaintiff as
a direct and proximate result of the violation. 95  Finally, the plain-
tiff must prove the amount of such damages.96  In a Robinson-
Patman Act case, the plaintiff must prove not only that the defend-
ant engaged in illegal pricing practices, but also that the plaintiff
lost business as the proximate result of such pricing practices.97
93. The defendant should, of course, first determine if the facts alleged are
sufficient to meet the interstate commerce test for jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.
The test under the Robinson-Patman Act is more stringent than the test under the
Sherman Act. To satisfy the requirements for jurisdiction under the Sherman Act,
the plaintiff may show either that the allegedly illegal activity took place in interstate
commerce or that the allegedly illegal activity had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); United States v. Women's Sportswear
Mfrs. Ass'n., 336 U.S. 460 (1949); Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 875 (1961); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n. v. United States, 210 F.2d
732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954). But under the Robinson-Patman
Act, jurisdiction vests only if the challenged activity (one or more of the allegedly
illegal sales) actually takes place in interstate commerce. The substantial-effect-on-
commerce test is not available. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186
(1974). This limitation has been specifically applied to a section 2(c) case. Rohrer
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1975 Trade Cas. 60,352 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
95. This principle has not been without conflict. Compare Billy Baxter, Inc.
v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971) and
Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963) with Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir.
1967) and Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955). Space
will not permit a full discussion of this controversy over standing to sue. See
generally, however, Handler, supra note 73, at 252-53 & nn. 204-06; Handler, The
Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-
Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-31 (1971); Pollock, Stand-
ing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32 ANTITRUST L. J.
5 (1966); Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in
Treble Damage Actions under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231 (1961).
96. The proper means of measuring such damages is another interesting conflict
that cannot be discussed in detail in this article. See Gass, Private Enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act: The Damage Controversy, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 153 (1970);
Handler, supra note 95, at 31-35. Compare Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can
Co., 330 U.S. 743, 757 (1947) (dictum) and Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970) and Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v.
Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 995-96 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945) with
Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
965 (1957).
97. See American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 508 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (10th Cir. 1975);
Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Thomas v. Amerada Hess Corp., 393 F.
Supp. 58 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See generally Timberlake, supra note 95.
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If the plaintiff's loss of business resulted from the plaintiffs own
inadequacies or from the legitimate competition of others, a cause of
action under the antitrust laws does not exist.98
In the case of a terminated distributor, agent, or broker, the
middleman's loss of business is occasioned by the termination, not
by the subsequent pricing practices of the manufacturer. In Robin-
son v. Stanley Home Products, Inc.,9 9 a manufacturer appointed a
manufacturer's representative as the exclusive commissioned agent
for sales in a particular geographic area. One customer in that
area began negotiations directly with the manufacturer and of-
fered to purchase the goods directly at reduced prices. The manu-
facturer accepted this offer and terminated the commissioned agent
representative. The terminated agent brought suit alleging that the
direct sales at reduced prices violated section 2(c). The court
granted the manufacturer's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and noted:
It is difficult to see how in this case the claimed injury
could be considered the direct result of the alleged viola-
tion. Assuming that [the manufacturer] sold cups to [the
customer] at a lower price than it charged competitors of
[the customer], this price differential was not the cause of
plaintiff's loss of his commission. . . .The lower price
allowed to [the customer] by [the manufacturer] may have
been a source of injury to some competitor of [the cus-
tomer]. It did not cause plaintiff's injury. The fact that
elimination of plaintiff's commission may have been eco-
nomically a condition precedent to the granting of a lower
price by [the manufacturer] does not make the failure to
pay that commission a result of the lower price. l00
In affirming this decision, the First Circuit stated that it did not
reach the question of whether the representative was a person in-
jured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws.'0 1  Instead, the
court affirmed on the basis that no violation had been alleged:
To say that a manufacturer who makes a price reduction
when he converts to direct selling has, without more, made
an allowance in lieu of brokerage would either be to say
that he cannot so convert, or that, if he does, the act forbids
his passing on any saving to the customer. We do not so
construe it.1
0 2
98. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 957-58
(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
99. 178 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1959), affd., 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959).
100. Id. at 233.
I01. 272 F.2d at 603 n.3.
102. Id. at 604.
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Even if the court had found the facts alleged sufficient to withstand
a motion to dismiss directed against the existence of a violation,
the court still would have had to determine if the alleged violation
was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintifrs injury. The
reasoning of the district court quoted above indicates that the mo-
tion to dismiss still would have been granted because the fact of
injury, if any, could not have been the result of the alleged viola-
tion.'03
V. CONCLUSION
There will undoubtedly be more private actions based on sec-
tion 2(c) where a middleman has been eliminated. They should be
decided in accordance with Green Bay and/or Stanley Home Prod-
ucts, for to do otherwise would be to compel the continued existence
of a severe market barrier in the distribution process. Hopefully,
section 2(c) will not be permitted to preclude the elimination of
middlemen and thus inhibit reduced costs and savings to buyers.
The country's economic condition'" simply cannot permit the pre-
clusion of increasingly sophisticated methods of distribution and
section 2(c) should not be used in a way that would deter the use
of those methods.
103. In Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974), a terminated
petroleum jobber alleged, inter alia, that direct sales violated the Robinson-Patman
Act and that the termination was therefore illegal. In dissolving a temporary injunc-
tion against the termination, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Stevens) held:
[To support a preliminary injunction] [t]here must also be substantial reason
to believe that the conduct of which the plaintiff complains is unlawful and
is the cause of his threatened loss. ...
In this case it is perfectly clear that, even if plaintiff is able to prove a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, there is no causal connection between
that violation and his termination.
Id. at 293.
104. For a contemporary comment on the relationship between inflation and the
antitrust laws in general, see Handler, Antitrust Myth and Reality in an Inflationary
Period, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 211 (1975).
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